arxiv8.0 / 10

SCR: Detecting Backdoor-Poisoned Samples through Clean-Reference Residuals

Yi Yang, Jinyang Huang, Feng-Qi Cui, Yu-Tong Guo, Sirui Zhao, Haiming Jin, Weihua Li, Quan Bai, Meng Li

Abstract

Deep neural networks are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, in which adversaries manipulate model predictions by injecting poisoned samples into training data. Detecting these samples remains challenging because legitimate semantic variation can obscure poisoning-related signals in learned representations. Consequently, class-level statistics used by existing detectors may flag benign feature deviations while overlooking poisoned samples that blend into the class distribution. In this paper, we propose Semantic Counterfactual Residualization (SCR), which uses a small set of clean reference samples to account for benign variation through sample-specific feature reconstruction. SCR identifies poisoned samples by detecting coherent deviations from these clean baselines, without requiring prior knowledge of the attacks. We evaluate SCR through experiments covering twelve dirty-label and clean-label attacks across CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and Tiny ImageNet. With a small clean-reference set, SCR achieves attack-averaged true positive rates above 99.5\% and false positive rates below 2\% on each dataset, outperforming eight representative detection baselines in macro-TPR.

Research area

adversarial robustnessmodel robustnesssecurity
Published
18 Nov 2026
Source
arxiv
Org
Hefei University of Technology
View paper
Sign in to read and join the discussion.