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pikit: A Composable Toolkit for Indirect Prompt Injection Research and Evaluation

Zonghao Ying, Xiangfan Wu, Bo Yang, Huiyu Wu, Xing Zheng, Huangsheng Cheng, Xiaorong Shi, Jing Guo

Abstract

Indirect prompt injection embeds malicious instructions within external content retrieved by LLM-based agents, altering target behavior without user authorization. We introduce pikit, a research toolkit designed to systematically evaluate these threats across three core dimensions: attacks (13 methods), channels (16 carriers across text and file modes), and defenses (9 prevention strategies and 3 offline detection baselines). Built on a decorator-based registry, pikit enables seamless extension of custom components without modifying core code, while a unified craft() API composes arbitrary attacks and channels in a single call. We evaluated the toolkit on the pi coding agent powered by an anonymized LLM in a production-like environment. Benchmarking 9 prevention strategies against high-risk attacks yields a 71.8\% relative reduction in attack success rate, with few\_shot\_warning and instruction\_hierarchy providing the strongest protection. Offline detection baselines achieve perfect precision but low recall, demonstrating that heuristic detectors complement rather than replace prompt-level defenses. To ensure reproducibility, each run automatically logs full prompts, agent event traces, session transcripts, and verdict records. Our code is available at https://github.com/Tencent/AI-Infra-Guard/tree/main/Research/pikit.

Research area

agentic ai auditingjailbreakingsecurity
Published
29 Sept 2026
Source
arxiv
Org
Tencent
View paper
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